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BOOK REVIEWS
Evidentialism and the Will to Believe , by Scott F. Aikin. Bloomsbury, 2014. Pp. 
214. $120.00 (hardcover).
MICHAEL PACE, Chapman University
In his introduction, Scott Aikin remarks that there has never before been 
a book-length commentary on W. K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief” and 
William James’s “The Will to Believe.” “With this book,” he announces, 
“that changes.” One might worry—as I did at first—that there may be 
compelling reasons why there has not been a book such as Aikin gives us, 
which consists in a section-by-section summary and critical analysis of 
each essay, in two very long chapters. (A concluding, third chapter func-
tions more as an appendix, taking up some loose ends.) After all, both 
James’s and Clifford’s essays were originally written for non-specialists, 
and they are clear enough to be anthologized in introductory textbooks 
that many of us require our beginning students to read. Wouldn’t a book-
length commentary be tedious or otiose?
I am pleased to report that any such worries about Aikin’s project are 
misplaced. The book is engaging as well as careful, and it touches insight-
fully on a surprisingly wide range of fundamental issues in epistemol-
ogy and ethics. It is also a highly enjoyable read, chock-full of humor. I 
could imagine basing a successful upper-level undergraduate course on 
just Aikin’s book and the two primary sources. A “slow reading” course 
of this sort would model for students how a philosopher carefully reads 
and criticizes important texts, and it would have a suitable breadth. More-
over, there are payoffs here for experts, since Aikin ably argues for some 
distinctive interpretative and philosophical claims, some of which I will 
critically examine in the remainder of this review.
Aikin adjudicates the Clifford-James dispute in favor of Clifford. 
He argues that Clifford’s case for evidentialism is cogent (with some 
“tweaking”), whereas James’s project fails even on the most generous in-
terpretation. Aikin summarizes Clifford’s evidentialism in the following 
“Integrated Evidentialist Rule” (IER):




(IER) If any subject (S) believes any proposition (p) at any time (t), then S has 
properly done so only if: (i) S has sufficient evidence at t that p is true, and 
(ii) all doubts S has had (and should have) regarding p’s truth or falsity have 
been investigated so that there are no truths S could have easily discovered 
that would have affected S’s evidence. (49–50)
The first condition of IER is intended to capture Clifford’s famous dictum: 
“It is wrong always, everywhere and for anyone to believe anything on 
insufficient evidence.” The second is intended to capture Clifford’s lesser-
known principle that it is wrong to believe things that one has not investi-
gated with due diligence. On Aikin’s interpretation, it is moral wrongness 
that Clifford has in view; IER should thus be understood as an ethical 
principle giving conditions for morally proper belief, rather than an epis-
temic principle intended to illuminate some familiar kind of epistemic 
property (such as justification, knowledge, or rationality).
Aikin defends IER against several prominent objections, including the 
charge that Clifford’s principle is too demanding, leading to a problem-
atic skepticism. In response to the skeptical challenge, Aikin teases out 
of Clifford’s essay a remarkably comprehensive epistemology, including 
proposals—which deserve more considerations than I can give here—for 
responding to Pyrrhonian skepticism and Hume’s challenge to induction, 
as well as substantive accounts of moral and testimonial knowledge.
However, a weakness of Aikin’s anti-skeptical defense is that he offers 
very little guidance about what it means for evidence to be sufficient. Notice 
that “sufficient” in IER cannot be short for “sufficient for counting as morally 
proper,” since that would render the first condition trivial. One approach to 
explicating evidential sufficiency might appeal to a threshold of epistemic 
probability (the likelihood of a proposition on one’s total evidence). One will 
then owe an account of how high the threshold is. Is it enough that evidence 
makes a proposition more likely than not, or must it make a proposition 
100 percent certain, or somewhere in between? A second approach might 
treat “sufficient” as short for “sufficient for knowledge-grade justification.” 
The strictness of the principle will then depend on the correct account of 
evidential standards for justification and knowledge, which is a matter of 
debate in epistemology. Descartes and contemporary infallibilists about 
knowledge have extremely high standards, requiring epistemic certainty. 
Fallibilists require something less than certainty, but owe an account of how 
low the standards can be.
The threat that IER might lead to skepticism, of course, will be much 
more serious if evidential sufficiency demands meeting very high, or even 
infallibilist standards. Aikin does not discuss the fallibilism/infallibilism 
debate, but he does point out that Clifford implicitly rejects Cartesian 
standards of evidence by allowing some cases of testimony and induc-
tive reasoning to count as sufficient evidence. This makes it all the more 
important, though, to clarify how strict the evidential standards for in-
ductive evidence are. (The threat of skepticism is also more serious than 
Aikin seems to realize for the specific account of appropriate testimonial 
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belief that he attributes to Clifford, which requires that hearers meet the 
following “testimonial requirement of knowledge”: “Listener A may hold 
that attester B has satisfied the testimonial requirement of knowledge for 
testimony that p only if A has reason to believe that (i) B’s claim that p is 
the kind of content that has publicly verifiable evidence so that A could 
access this evidence and (ii) B’s claim that p is the result of B’s sufficient 
inquiry regarding p and access to sufficient evidence that p” [63].)
Clifford’s central examples (the shipbuilder who negligently sends an 
unseaworthy ship out to sea and the islanders who convict a group of 
natives on trumped up charges) suggest that he had in mind very high, 
though not infallibilist, evidential standards. The shipbuilder’s belief that 
the ship is seaworthy would still be seriously morally wrong even if he 
had a slight preponderance of evidence that made the proposition just 
barely more likely than a coin toss. Something closer to certain evidence 
seems required for his belief to be appropriate.
Of course, Clifford’s shipbuilder and islanders cases are idiosyncratic 
insofar as the moral risk of error is extraordinarily high; if a false belief 
is formed and acted upon, people die. A question that Aikin does not ex-
plicitly take up is whether standards for sufficient evidence are invariant 
or whether they might vary in different circumstances. IER, as stated, is 
consistent with the idea that the standards for sufficient evidence might 
vary depending on the circumstances. Perhaps evidential standards for 
belief are like evidential standards for court judgments, where we apply 
a strict, beyond-reasonable-doubt standard in criminal cases but a lower, 
preponderance-of evidence standard in civil cases. In the contemporary 
epistemology literature, “pragmatic encroachment” theorists have argued 
that standards of evidence for justification or knowledge vary depend-
ing on practical or moral circumstances, and it is disappointing that Aikin 
does not directly consider these issues, especially since some pragmatic 
encroachment theorists claim inspiration from Clifford and James. (For 
a defense of pragmatic encroachment that takes James as its inspiration, 
see Michael Pace, “The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justifica-
tion, Moral Encroachment, and James’ ‘Will To Believe,’” Noûs 45 [2011]: 
239–268; for a recent one inspired by Clifford, see Matthew McGrath and 
Jeremy Fantl, “Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know,” in Contem-
porary Debates in Epistemology, ed. John Turri and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed. 
[Wiley-Blackwell, 2014], 84–94.)
Although he does not directly address the question of whether evi-
dential standards might vary, some things Aikin says in the context of 
defending Clifford suggest the view that the standards of evidence in 
IER are invariably quite high (though not infallible). In his essay, Clifford 
anticipates the objection that his high-stakes examples do not support 
the generalization that it is always (everywhere, for anyone, etc.) wrong 
to believe on insufficient evidence. Perhaps, according to the objector, it 
is okay to form relatively trivial beliefs on insufficient evidence. Clifford 
gives two replies intended to demonstrate that “no real belief, however 
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trifling or fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignificant.” First, he 
claims that the content of any belief may, for all we know, turn out to have 
more important consequences than it seems. (Aikin calls this the “Content 
Slide.”) Second, Clifford claims that bad intellectual habits are formed by 
believing even trivia on insufficient evidence.
Aikin argues that there is more to these responses than is often ac-
knowledged. For example, he illustrates the plausibility of the Content 
Slide with the following description of Karla, who has a seemingly trivial 
belief that her favorite sports team (the Cowpokes) will win, even though 
the evidence suggests otherwise.
How does the content slide happen? Well, perhaps with the fact that teams 
that are of championship caliber should get media coverage. But the Cow-
pokes don’t get any. Well, there must be some reason for that, thinks Karla, 
and she then hypothesizes that the media is ignoring the Cowpokes. There’s 
likely a conspiracy against this team—they clearly are contenders, but get 
not even a sniff. The fix must be in. Nobody wants the Cowpokes to win, so 
the media will ignore them with hopes they’ll go away. Every expert who 
holds the Cowpokes have no chance, then, is part of conspiracy, and just 
empty talking heads. And so Karla has gone from one overbelief born of en-
thusiasm to now a belief that she can’t trust most of the experts on a matter 
of circumstance to her. If the sports case isn’t moving, consider this analo-
gous to politics and one’s favored candidate. (35)
As I write this, at the start of a Trump presidency, one can hardly fail to ap-
preciate how the throw-away last line might inspire many more examples 
of the content slide. Insufficiently supported political beliefs can (and do) 
lead to conspiracy theories, distrust of longstanding institutions, and other 
bad consequences. Further, Aikin supplements Clifford’s argument with a 
good discussion of relevant work in social psychology on error amplifica-
tion and polarization in groups. “Given our evidence of human and group 
psychology,” he concludes, “overbelief is a dangerous business. Even if 
it turns out that some are inert with regard to bad consequences, the fact 
that so many have the bad consequences makes it objectionable to allow 
any” (41). When it comes to belief, Aikin seems to suggest, the stakes are 
always high because of the dangers inherent in believing falsehoods.
Even so, it seems exaggerated to think that we can never accurately 
anticipate the likely consequences of our beliefs. The shipbuilder, for ex-
ample, can surely know that the proposition that the ship is seaworthy 
carries with it a lot more moral risk of error than beliefs he might form 
by picking up a phonebook and reading from a page at random. Further-
more, as I will discuss below, James makes a compelling case that the risk 
of error must be balanced with another risk that in some circumstances 
can be much greater, namely the risk of failing to believe something that 
turns out to be true.
Let us turn, then, to Aikin’s discussion of James, who famously held 
that in special circumstances it is appropriate to believe propositions, in-
cluding religious ones, for practical reasons. Aikin, poking fun at James’s 
BOOK REVIEWS 493
over-the-top style, quips that James not only explicitly announces his 
thesis but also “was good enough to put it all in italics” (111).
The Thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: Our passional nature not only lawfully 
may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine op-
tion that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under 
such circumstances, ‘Do not decide, but leave the question open,’ is itself a passional 
decision—just like deciding yes or no—and is attended with the same risk of losing 
the truth (James, “The Will to Believe,” IV, emphasis in original).
As everyone familiar with James’s essay knows, “genuine option” is a 
technical term that he cashes out in terms of three further semi-technical 
terms. A genuine option is “living, momentous, and forced.” Following 
many commentators, Aikin has some critical things to say about the way 
James explains these conditions. He also presses a pithy initial worry, 
which he calls the “less talkin’, more rockin’” objection. The idea is that 
we have prima facie reason to be suspicious of the cogency of any argu-
ment that involves a lot of technicalities and qualifications in its setup, as 
James’s argument does.
In a more serious mode, Aikin accuses James of moving the goalposts 
(committing “the old switcheroo”). James begins his essay by promising 
to defend something akin to traditional Christian belief, but by the end 
of the essay he only defends the religiously obscure proposition “that the 
best things are the more eternal things” and “that we are better off even 
now if we believe . . . [this] first affirmation to be true” (“Will to Believe,” 
X). As Aikin aptly points out, it is not clear what this proposition even 
means, and it would certainly not be recognized as a central doctrine of 
any major world religion.
According to Aikin, James commits the old switcheroo in an attempt 
to paper over a crucial flaw in his central argument. On Aikin’s interpre-
tation, the lynchpin of James’s argument is a set of counterexamples to 
Clifford’s principle that involve “doxastically efficacious” beliefs. These 
are cases in which, as James says, “faith in a fact can help create the fact” 
(Section IX). James’s examples include an Alpine climber whose belief that 
he can successfully jump across a crevasse is causally necessary for him 
to be able to do so and a partygoer who believes that a stranger will like 
him, thereby making it more likely that the stranger will. Propositions 
that are doxastically efficacious are such that believing them either makes 
them true or objectively likely to be true, and James argues that it is thus 
appropriate to believe them for practical reasons, even without sufficient 
evidence.
It is at this point in the argument that James makes the old switcheroo, 
according to Aikin. Recognizing that his challenge to IER depends on the 
special features of doxastically efficacious propositions, James cooks up a 
proposition about the value of eternal things, which, he claims, captures 
the essence of religious belief. James picks this unorthodox proposition, ac-
cording to Aikin, because he thinks that it is doxastically efficacious. (Given 
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some antirealist presuppositions about value, which Aikin attributes to 
James based on other sources, believing that eternal things are supremely 
valuable will make them supremely valuable.) But Aikin accuses James of 
obscuring the fact that his argument only works for doxastically efficacious 
beliefs, a fact that would require another qualification to his main thesis: 
Someone may engage the will to believe only when a proposition is doxasti-
cally efficacious as well as living, momentous, forced, and undecidable on in-
tellectual grounds. (Even more talkin’!) The revised thesis spells disaster for 
James’s project as a defense of ordinary religious belief, since most orthodox 
religious claims are not doxastically efficacious. A Christian’s believing that 
God exists or that Jesus rose from the dead, for example, has no causal effect 
on whether these propositions are true or objectively likely. Thus, James’s 
argument involves a bait and switch that fails as a defense of the religious 
beliefs of ordinary folk.
Further, Aikin objects that doxastically efficacious propositions are not 
even genuine counterexamples to Clifford’s evidentialism. When we rec-
ognize that we believe a proposition that is doxastically efficacious, Aikin 
says, “we have reason to hold that the fact will come to be. That’s evi-
dence” (153). Aikin’s idea seems to be that the Alpine climber, for example, 
will have the following argument available as evidence (where p is the 
proposition, “I will successfully jump the crevasse”):
1. If I believe p, then p is likely to be true.
2. I do believe p.
3. So, p is likely to be true.
A defender of James has available several compelling replies to Aikin’s 
interpretation and critique. First, Aikin’s attempt to defang James’s coun-
terexamples is not convincing. To see why, we need first to note a subtle 
difference between Aikin’s IER and Clifford’s original principle. Clifford 
held that it is wrong to “believe on insufficient evidence.” But IER is 
weaker, implying only that it is wrong to believe when one lacks suffi-
cient evidence. IER omits a “basing requirement,” that is, a requirement 
that proper beliefs must be based on the good evidence one has. When 
this plausible requirement is added to IER, the counterexamples stand. 
For, even if the Alpine climber has access to the above argument after she 
believes, she could not properly base her belief on the argument, since it 
includes as a premise that she already has the belief!
More important, there are more charitable interpretations of James, ac-
cording to which the doxastically efficacious proposition counterexamples 
are not central to James’s main argument. As I see it, the central and most 
enduring part of James’s essay is his discussion of the two-part truth goal. 
James points out that our intellectual goal is not just to avoid having false 
beliefs but also to believe significant truths. Thus, James:
There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion—ways 
entirely different, and yet about whose difference the theory of knowledge 
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seems hitherto to have shown very little concern. . . . Believe truth! Shun 
error!—these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing 
between them we may end by coloring differently our whole intellectual 
life. We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of 
error as secondary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of er-
ror as more imperative, and let truth take its chance. Clifford . . . exhorts us 
to the latter course. Believe nothing, he tells us, keep your mind in suspense 
forever, rather than by closing it on insufficient evidence incur the awful risk 
of believing lies .(“Will to Believe, VII)
James’s insights are related to the statistical distinction between “type 
1” and “type 2” errors. One commits a type 1 error when one has a belief 
that turns out to be false, and a type 2 error when one fails to have a 
belief in a proposition that is true. As James suggests, the two parts of 
our intellectual goal are in tension. Moreover, as several contemporary 
epistemologists have pointed out, different evidential standards involve 
different proposals for how to strike an appropriate balance. Adopting 
infallible evidential standards would assure one of avoiding type 1 errors, 
but skepticism would be the result and type 2 errors would abound. 
Adopting lower standards will lower the risk of type 2 errors, but at a 
greater risk of type 1 errors. (For discussion, see Wayne Riggs, “Balancing 
Our Epistemic Ends,” Nous 37 [2012], 342–352; Pace, “The Epistemic Value 
of Moral Considerations”; Mark Schroeder, “Stakes, Withholding, and 
Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies 160 [2012]: 
265–285; and Thomas Kelly, “How to Be an Epistemic Permissivist,” in 
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ed. John Turri and Ernest Sosa, 2nd 
ed. [Wiley-Blackwell, 2014], 298–311.)
James’s discussion of the two-part truth goal suggests that it would be 
a bad thing practically and epistemically if the norms we adopt are too 
strict. Suppose—as some epistemologists have argued—that infallible evi-
dential standards are built into our ordinary concept of knowledge. On 
the interpretation of IER that takes “sufficient” evidence to be short for 
“sufficient for knowledge,” James’s critique seems powerful. Infallibilist 
standards privilege avoiding error way too much, guaranteeing that we 
will fail to believe things that are important to believe if they are true. If 
evidentialism demands that we have sufficient evidence for knowledge 
and knowledge requires that, so much the worse for evidentialism (and, 
perhaps, so much the worse for the idea that knowledge is a category of 
great epistemic value). Moreover, this critique is epistemic and not merely 
pragmatic, since it involves thinking about the best way to balance our 
two-part cognitive goal.
In his discussion of the passage quoted above, Aikin accuses James 
of relying on an uncharitable interpretation of Clifford that attributes to 
Clifford a commitment to implausibly high evidential standards. That 
may be right, although it is open to James’s defenders to point out, as I 
did above, that not much guidance is given by Aikin or Clifford regarding 
how high the standards are. Aikin also interprets James as defending the 
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right to follow only the command to believe truths, giving no heed to the 
risks of error. He points out that it would be abhorrent for Clifford’s ship-
builder to believe that the ship is seaworthy on the grounds that he values 
taking courageous risks in believing and doesn’t care so much about being 
wrong. However, I think that this is an uncharitable reading of James. 
The initial conditions that James gives for engaging the will to believe 
arguably already give some weight to the “avoid errors” part of the truth 
goal, insofar as they require the belief to be a live hypothesis that cannot 
be decided on intellectual grounds. (I have elsewhere argued that James 
should have required that evidence at least make a proposition more 
likely than not in order for it to be permissible to believe it [Pace, “The 
Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations”].) Aikin seems in several places 
to overlook this (but you can’t just ignore the talkin’ when you don’t think 
the argument’s rockin’!). Further, although James does, admittedly, some-
times talk as if the best way to balance the competing truth goals is purely 
a matter of personal preference, it is not too difficult to think of ways to 
extend James’s view so that we can morally criticize people (such as the 
shipbuilder) who fail to take into account serious moral costs involved 
in avoiding errors or failing to believe truths. (See Pace, “The Epistemic 
Value of Moral Considerations.”)
On an interpretation of James that puts his discussion of the truth goal 
at center stage, the doxastically efficacious belief counterexamples are 
supplemental points that are not central to his main argument. Such an 
interpretation has the advantage of not forcing us to revise the thesis he 
claims to defend or attribute to him an obvious fallacy. But what about Ai-
kin’s claim that James betrays his dependence on the counterexamples in 
choosing to defend his unorthodox proposition about the value of eternal 
things? Also, is Aikin right that James commits the old switcheroo in de-
fending that proposition? I don’t think so. James advertises from the start 
that his argument is going to be highly personal, depending on which 
propositions are live hypotheses given one’s evidential situation. He is 
also forthright in stating that he does not find traditional Christian teach-
ings to be live hypotheses. (Late in the book, Aikin dismisses traditional 
religious claims out of hand on the grounds that the evidence weighs too 
heavily against them, so he is in agreement with James on this point.) This 
is enough to explain why the religious proposition James explicitly de-
fends is unorthodox, but it also allows (as James seem to have intended) 
that the argument can be adapted by someone who takes different reli-
gious claims to be live options and who can defend them as such. True 
enough, if it can be shown that the evidence against traditional religious 
claims is overwhelming, this will sink such a project. But that was part 
of the dialectic from the start, and determining which religious hypoth-
eses, if any, are live is beyond the scope of what James (or Aikin) sets out 
to do. 
